



OFFICE of INTELLIGENCE and ANALYSIS

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TERRORISM

(U//FOUO) Domestic Violent Extremists Express Interest in Targeting Fiber Optic Cables, Raising Potential for Widespread Disruption

(U//FOUO) Scope Note: This is DHS I&A's first assessment of Domestic Violent Extremist threats to US fiber optic cable lines. This assessment seeks to provide law enforcement and public safety partners with an overview of how DVEs could adopt tactics used by criminal actors to damage US critical infrastructure to further their ideological goals.

(U//FOUO) Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) have increasingly discussed targeting terrestrial fiber optic cables across the United States, raising the threat to fiber-dependent infrastructure sectors. DVEs frequently discuss that fiber optic cables are a preferred target to disrupt critical infrastructure pursuant to their ideological goals of dismantling current societal structures. The spread of the COVID-19 virus prompted increased telework that has persisted, creating dependencies on fiber optic cable networks that were highlighted within information sharing platforms utilized by some DVEs.

- *(U//FOUO)* Since 2020, DHS and open-source reporting have shown an uptick in DVEs across ideologies sharing simple tactics specifically related to fiber optic cables. In 2024, a blog utilized by some anarchist violent extremists used a military target assessment method to encourage attacking fiber optics as an “easy” target while referencing past attacks. In 2023, a channel frequently used by environmental violent extremists shared five issues of a magazine that critiqued the tactics used in successful previous attacks. In 2022, the Terrorgram Collective publication discussed tactics for targeting fiber cables, including the use of firearms, arson, and power tools.
- *(U//FOUO)* Several discussions in recent years among users of an online forum frequented by DVEs describe fiber optic cables as low-cost/high-reward targets to disrupt critical infrastructure. These users indicate a preference for fiber optic cable cuts due to the perceived simplicity and ability to avoid law enforcement interdiction.
- *(U//FOUO)* Fiber optic cable cuts often cause cascading effects on critical infrastructure sectors, such as communications, and delay emergency services

from responding to incidents. Across the United States, fiber optic cable cuts have disrupted 911 services and forced police stations to redirect personnel to field emergency calls through non-emergency lines. Individuals from North Carolina, who intentionally cut fiber optic cables in Connecticut, disabled communications and internet-based financial services to thousands of homes and businesses for hours.

(U//FOUO) **While DVEs have focused on opportunistic or simple attacks thus far, online narratives about fiber optic vulnerability and increased information sharing could inspire DVEs to engage in larger-scale, pre-planned fiber attacks in the Homeland.** Recent attacks in France and Germany that used multiple and coordinated cuts to fiber optics surrounding a target area resulted in blackouts and communications stoppages that strained emergency services' responses.

- *(U//FOUO)* Information shared online about fiber optic systems and media coverage of attacks could inform DVE attack planning and operations. In February 2024, an online user claiming to be a former cable worker provided a detailed description of how a coordinated group of individuals could disrupt communications for an entire city. In 2023, online discussions, in response to news media coverage of recent attacks, dissected attacks in Sacramento, California, from 2014 and examined the nature of the successful attacks to develop methods for making future attacks more severe, indicating potential pre-planning by actors.
- *(U//FOUO)* DVEs could also draw inspiration from European attacks that disrupted citywide telecommunications and transportation. Violent extremists in France caused massive disruptions to telecommunications by targeting primary fiber optic cables in several regions. In Germany, travelers were left stranded after actors cut fiber optic lines and caused hours-long train stoppages.
- *(U//FOUO)* Possible indicators of pre-operational planning for a large-scale fiber optic attack include unauthorized surveillance around fiber optic sites, particularly connection locations; signs of trespassing or digging around known fiber connection locations; and successful small-scale fiber optic cuts.

Source, Reference, and Dissemination Information

Definitions

(U//FOUO) **Domestic Violent Extremist (DVE):** An individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics alone does not constitute violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected. DVEs can fit within one or multiple categories of ideological motivation and can span a broad range of groups or movements. I&A utilizes this term synonymously with “domestic terrorist.”

(U//FOUO) **Terrorgram Collective:** An online collective of Telegram channels maintained by some racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists.

(U//FOUO) **Anarchist Violent Extremists (AVEs):** Individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence, to further their opposition to all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions, which they perceive as harmful to society.

(U//FOUO) **Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists (AREVEs):** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in the unlawful use or threat of force or violence or intent to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals or perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.

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(U) **To report this incident to the Intelligence Community, please contact your DHS I&A Field Operations officer at your state or major urban area fusion center, or e-mail DHS.INTEL.FOD.HQ@hq.dhs.gov.** DHS I&A Field Operations officers are forward deployed to every US state and territory and support state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners in their intelligence needs; they ensure any threats, incidents, or suspicious activity is reported to the Intelligence Community for operational awareness and analytic consumption.

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